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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
FACTS
It is undisputed that the accident occurred at the Tintersection of 5065 West and North Temple in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

There was, however, no evidence presented at trial or

during discovery which would sustain any allegation that the
defendant failed to stop at the stop sign controlling the intersection.

Plaintiff herself states the following in her deposi-

tion:
Q. And as far as Miss Duncan is
concerned, you don't know whether she
actually stopped at the stop sign or do
you?
A. I did not see her stopped. I
didn't see her until she was coming into
the street.
Q. Is there anything that would
obstruct your vision or her vision as
she stopped at the stop sign?
A.

No.

I don't think so.
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Q. Do you have any idea why you
didnft see her at the stop sign?
A.

I donft think she stopped.

Q. But you didn't see her run
through the stop sign?
A, No, I actually didn't, but I
don't — I don't think she stopped. I
think—I can't really remember. I mean
truthfully I don't remember.
Q. Well, what makes you think
she didn't stop?
A. I think she didn't stop because
I seen her car. There are trees beside
the road—little trees they planted, and
just before you get there, maybe like that,
it's — I seen her car at this point just
before the little trees, and I don't think
there was enough time to stop.
(Biswell deposition, p. 16, line 6 through p. 17, line 1.)
Plaintiff goes on and states:
Q. Well, you didn't see her in
one continuous motion run through the
stop sign, did you?
A. I don't remember that she did-I don't—I don't think she had time to
stop, but I don't know.
Q. I'm just trying to get that
cleared up.
We'll mark that as Exhibit 1 when we're
through.
Do you have any estimate as to how fast
Miss Duncan was traveling at the time
that you first noticed an accident was
going to take place?
A.

No.

(Biswell deposition, p. 19, lines 12-21.)
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During the trial plaintiff testified:
Q. Now, you didn't see Ms. Duncan actually
run the stop sign, did you?
A. No.
Actually drive through the stop sign here
on the side of the street.
A. No. But I never got to the point of
seeing her at the stop sign.
(Partial Transcript, p. 118, lines 11-17.)
Tessie Higgs, a witness to the accident who was
following the plaintiff just prior to the accident, states:
Q. When did you first see Miss Duncan?
Where was her vehicle at the time you
first saw her?
A. Just pulling out of the intersection
that she was coming through.
Q. Was her vehicle in North Temple,
in that street?
A. You could say from the front of
her car to the front tire was when I seen
her car.
Q. Okay. But her vehicle had passed
the stop sign area or the place where
you normally stop?
A. Yes.
Q.

At the time you first saw her?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

But it was moving at that time also.

Q.

I understand.

It was moving?

A. Yes.
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Q. Okay. Did you get—when you saw the
car, the first time you saw Miss Duncan's
car, did you determine how fast it was
moving?
A.

No.

Q. Is it possible to estimate?
want you to guess.

I don't

A. No, I'm not going to guess, but
I couldn't tell you how fast she was going;
but, I do know she was moving at the time
because when the white car pulled out in
front of Miss Biswell--first of all, I
could think of when I seen—you glance
opposite direction to see what else is
going to come out in front of you. Well,
I knew Miss Biswell was going to be hit.
But I wouldn't guess on the speed.
(Tessie Higgs deposition, p. 21, line 8 through p. 22, line 12.)
In this regard, the defendant Diane Duncan states in her
deposition:
Q.

You did see the stop sign and you stopped?

A. Yes.
Q.

Did you come to a complete stop.

A. Yes.
(Duncan deposition, p. 22, lines 16-19.)
Q. You mention that you stopped
at the stop sign. Then what did you do?
A. Proceeded to turn left onto
North Temple.
Q.

Did you look both ways?

A.

As I recall I did.

Q.

Did you see any traffic?

A.

No.
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Q.

You didn't see any oncoming traffic?

A.

No.

Q.

So you didn't see Miss Biswell coming?

A. No.
(Id. at p. 24, line 3 through p. 25, line 6.)
Thus, no one saw the defendant fail to stop at the stop
sign and the only evidence of such was the plaintiff's mere
speculation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah law has long held that the imposition of punitive
damages requires malice, ill will or evil motive. Although the
court in Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); modified 617
P.2d 700 (Utah 1980), allowed a standard of "reckless disregard"
as a basis for punitive damages only in false imprisonment cases,
the court later specifically overturned the Terry decision in
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Since Terry was overturned, the court by implication overturned
those cases relying upon Terry in applying or allowing the application of a "reckless disregard" standard.

Therefore, plaintiff

cannot recover punitive damages without showing malice, ill will
or evil motive.
Even if this court determines that a "knowing and reckless indifference" standard as set out in Terry should be applied
for punitive damages, such standard properly focuses upon the
state of mind of the defendant and requires knowing indifference.
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In this case, there was clearly no evidence whatsoever
of any reckless conduct on the part of the defendant, or any evidence of a "knowing indifference" to any specific person or
event.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that any intoxication

contributed in any way to the accident in this case, and the
facts in this accident could just as easily be explained through
simple negligence.

Since there was no reckless conduct, punitive

damages are clearly inappropriate under either standard the court
chooses to apply.
Driving while intoxicated, in and of itself, is insufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.

Clearly there

must be some evidence that the intoxication contributed to the
accident and that defendant's conduct was reckless.

Thus if the

court wished to allow for punitive damages in intoxication cases,
defendant contends that there should likewise be some evidence
beyond what can otherwise be viewed as simple negligence.

To

allow punitive damages to go to the jury in the instant case
would allow it in every case involving intoxication, no matter
the level of intoxication or the other factors in the case.
Utah social policy clearly does not mandate the imposition of punitive damages in this case.

The Utah Supreme Court in

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah
1983), clearly stated that punitive damages are not appropriate
unless the defendant's conduct is outrageous and malicious and
not likely to be deterred by other means.
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Since the Utah

legislature has passed one of the strongest and most severe
impaired driving laws in the country, such conduct is likely to
be deterred by those laws.

In this regard, the legislature has

established what it considered to be the proper punishment and
deterrence for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The
Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that punitive damages are
not intended as compensation for the plaintiff but are to serve
the interests of society.

The plaintiff should not be allowed to

penalize the defendant a second time by lining her own pockets
with money taken in the interests of society in addition to her
own recovery of compensatory damages.
Since the defendant in this case has already been subjected once to a criminal penalty for her conduct, she should not
be penalized a second time for that very same conduct.

To allow

this second penalty would be a clear violation of the
Constitution of Utah which prohibits any person from being twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Finally, the trial court properly denied plaintiff1s
motion for new trial based upon the trial court's jury
instruction.

The trial court's instruction on aggravation was a

correct statement of Utah law and in no way prejudicial to the
defendant.
If the issues listed on plaintiff's docketing statement
but not addressed in his brief are not waived, defendant requests
an opportunity to respond to those issues.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE AWARDED IN UTAH
WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF MALICE, KNOWING, ILL WILL
OR EVIL MOTIVE.
Utah law has long held that the awarding of punitive
damages requires malice, ill will or evil motive.

"Punitive

damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of
judgement and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence."
Restatement (Second) of Torts §908 comment b at 465 (1979).
One of the early cases to address this standard was
Murphy vs. Booth, 36 Utah 285, 103 P. 768 (1909).

Plaintiff in

that case filed a claim against defendant alleging malicious
prosecution.

Plaintiff there contended that defendant had

instituted a criminal complaint against plaintiff alleging that
plaintiff had obtained money under false pretenses.

Plaintiff

further alleged that defendant's action was "falsely, wickedly
and maliciously" contrived with the intent to injure plaintiff,
without any reasonable or probable cause. At trial, the court
charged the jury:
If you find from the evidence that the
defendant caused plaintiff to be arrested
for the purpose of assisting defendant in
collecting a claim for monies which defendant
thought he had against plaintiff, or to
compel the delivery of property, or to
satisfy some grudge or hatred, or to
accomplish some other ulterior or wrongful
purpose, then it was begun maliciously as
though inspired by revenge.
103 P. at 770.
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The award of punitive damages, reduced by the trial court, was
affirmed on appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court, adopting the rule

suggested by the appellant stated:
Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages
are such damages as are in excess of the
actual loss, and are allowed where a
tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual
malice, deliberate violence, oppression
or fraud.
103 P. at 768.
In order to sustain an award for punitive damages, the Utah
Supreme Court as early as the Murphy case required a state of
mind which evidenced evil motive, actual malice, deliberate
violence, oppression or fraud.
In Evans vs. Gainsford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d. 431
(Utah 1953), plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery.
The court awarded plaintiff $1 ,000.00 compensatory damages and
$1,499.05 in punitive damages.

In so doing, the court stated:

Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded as
punishment to the defendant for malicious
conduct and as a wholesome warning to
defendant and others not to engage in
s imilar indiscretions.
247 P.2d. at 434.
In Holland vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d. 390, 353 P.2d. 989
(1960), an action was brought alleging fraud in connection with
the sale of a mining claim.

In that case,

the court stated:

Where there is a wrong involving the
violation of a duty springing from a
relation of trust or confidence and the
wrong is of a gross and aggravated nature,
the malicious conduct necessary to
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justify punitive damages may be found.
In submitting the case of punitive
damages, the court correctly instructed
the jury that they could award such
damages only if they found that
Moreton's conduct was willful and
malicious. [Emphasis added.]
353 P.2d. at 995.
Thus, even where there was a relationship of trust between the
parties resulting in a higher standard of care, the court still
required plaintiff to prove a state of mind evidenced by malice
and willful conduct.
In Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d. 168, 369 P.2d. 933 (1962),
the court affirmed the dismissal of a claim for exemplary damages
stating that such damages "may be awarded only where a willful
and malicious injury has been perpetrated.tf

Ld«

at

P a 8 e 936.

In Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d. 152, 379 P.2d. 380
(1963), the trial court submitted the issue to the jury as to
whether the conduct of the defendant was willful and malicious.
Under the facts of that case, the defendant's horses trespassed
on plaintiff's property "even after repeated warnings and
remonstrances . . . with indifference to the consequences and to
plaintiff's rights."

The Supreme Court sustained the awarding of

punitive damages upon a finding of deliberate and willful conduct.
In Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d. 297, 452 P.2d.
325 (1969), the court rejected plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages stating that it must appear "not only that there was a
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wrongful invasion of plaintiff's rights, but that it was done
willfully and maliciously."

452 P.2d. at 328.

In Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d. 1325 (Utah 1975), the
court allowed but reduced the punitive damages stating that such
damages may be awarded only if "the jury finds that such injury
was willful and malicious." 538 P.2d. at 1329.
In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d. 354 (Utah 1975), the
court stated the purpose of punitive damages which are "a punishment of the defendant for a particularly grievous injury caused
by conduct which is not only wrongful, but which is willful and
malicious."

542 P.2d. at 539.

Thus, prior to 1979, it is abundantly clear that the
award of punitive damages must be founded upon nothing less than
willful and malicious conduct, or at the very least some intentional act to do harm or injury.
In Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d. 314 (Utah 1979); modified
617 P.2d. 700 (Utah 1980), a customer brought a malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against a
merchant.

In recognizing the general rule, the court stated:
Generally in personal injury cases the rule
is that before the jury can award punitive
or exemplary damages, the party against whom
the damages are to be awarded must have acted
willfully and maliciously.

605 P.2d. at 327.
The court then went on to recognize an exception to the rule in
false imprisonment cases.

By its own terms, the exception found
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in Terry was to apply only to false imprisonment cases. Relying
on the case of Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W. 61, 71 (N.D. 1968), the
court stated:
It has long been the rule that in false
imprisonment cases punitive damages may
be awarded when a wrongful act is done
recklessly or in open disregard of one's
civil obligations and the rights of
others.
This presumed malice or malice in law does
not consist of personal hate or ill will of
one person towards another, but rather refers
to that state of mind which is reckless of law
and of the legal rights of the citizen in a
person's conduct towards that citizen.
Therefore, in false imprisonment cases, the
defendent need not act with actual ill will
or hatred towards the person being confined.
In such cases malice in law will be implied
from injustifiable conduct which causes the
injury complained of or from a wrongful act
intentionally done without cause or excuse.
[Emphasis added.]
605 P.2d. at 327.
The fact that the Terry case was specifically limited to
false imprisonment cases was made clear in EIkington v. Foust,
618 P.2d. 37 (Utah 1980), an action brought by a daughter against
her stepfather for sexual assault and abuse.

In affirming an

award of punitive damages, the court stated therein:
Punitive damages may be awarded where the
nature of the wrong complained of and the
injury inflicted goes beyond merely
violating the rights of another in that
it is found to be willful and malicious.
They are allowed as a punishment to the
offender and as a warning to him and
others not to engage in similar vexatious
actions. (Emphasis added.)
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618 P.2d. at 41.
Further, in First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.
Feedyards, 653 P.2d. 591 (Utah 1982) (decided after Terry)f the
court again affirmed the "willful and malicious" standard in nonfalse imprisonment cases.

In that case, damages were awarded for

wrongful attachment by the bank.

In discussing the award of

$100,000.00 punitive damages, the court stated:
Punitive damages constitute "an extraordinary
remedy" . . . outside the field of usual
redress remedies "which should be applied
with caution lest engendered by passion or
prejudice because of defendant's wrongdoing,
the^award becomes unrealistic or unreasonable."
Such damages may be awarded "where the nature
of the wrong complained of and the injury
inflicted goes beyond merely violating the
rights of another in that it is found to be
willful and malicious."
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at page 598.
Consequently in at least two cases following Terry, the court
affirmed the standard for imposing punitive damages as "willful
and malicious" standard, and not a "reckless indifference"
standard.
Then in Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d. 267
(1982), the court discussed a broader standard for punitive damages relying on language in Terry v. ZCMI, (supra.).

A property

owner had sued an adjoining landowner for pollution of the plaintiff's culinary water caused by percolation of oil wells on
defendant's property.

Defendant in that case trespassed on

plaintiff's land, spraying wastewater over it and failed to

-13-

comply with state law.

The Court held that defendent's discharge

of wastewater into the disposal pit, intending that it seep into
and percolate through the soil, was willful, intentional and
carried out in disregard of plaintiff's rights.

The conduct was

sufficient to support a finding of a willful and intentional act
that could very well have been sufficient under language used
before Terry v. ZCMI for allowing punitive damages.
In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills, 675 P.2d. 1179 (Utah 1983),
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Raleigh Hills
Hospital seeking punitive damages.

The evidence established that

on the third day of the decedent's admission to the hospital, a
hospital employee had allowed the decedent to use a razor to
shave.

Instead, the decedent used the razor to slash his wrists

and died four days later.

In discussing the standard for the

imposition of punitive damages, the court stated:
Our cases have generally held that punitive
damages may be awarded only on proof of
"willful and malicious" conduct [cites
omitted.], or on proof of conduct which
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the
rights of others, Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., supra.; Terry v. Zion1s
Cooperative Merchantile Institution, supra.,
~ 7*~* '. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at page 1186.
It is important to note that the cases relied on for the
"knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the
rights of others" standard are Terry (strictly limited to false
imprisonment cases) and Branch (which relied on Terry).
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It is

also important to note that the Supreme Court did not say that
mere reckless conduct itself would support a claim for punitive
damages.

Only if such reckless conduct evidenced "a knowing and

reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights of
others, could such damages be awarded."

Behrens v. Raleigh

Hills, 675 P.2d at 1186.
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court specifically overturned
Terry in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah
1984) stating:
In light of the apparent weight of authority
and persuasive scholarly reasoning in support
of defendant's position, we find that a
sufficient and sound basis exists for
departing from the malice in law standard
followed in Terry. Accordingly, we adopt
as the appropriate standard for determining
the availability of a punitive damage award
in an action for false imprisonment that of
"malice in fact1' or "actual malice".
Having expressly overturned Terry, the Court impliedly overturned
those decisions which rely on the Terry "malice in law" standard.
Plaintiff argues that the McFarland holding was limited only to
false imprisonment cases.

Even if that be true, the Branch and

the Behrens cases specifically relied on language from the Terry
decision, and must be viewed as progeny for the standard used in
Terry.

Once Terry is overturned, it is arguable that the progeny

fall with it.
Admittedly, however, several cases since McFarland have
discussed a "reckless indifference" standard for the imposition
of punitive damages.

The cases do not state whether such a stan-
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dard is the standard in all non-false imprisonment cases or
whether a "reckless disregard11 standard may be relied on only in
an appropriate case.

These cases clearly suggest, however, that

the focus must be placed on the defendant's intent regarding his
conduct.

Only if such conduct is supportive of a state of mind

evidencing a "knowing and reckless indifference" can an award of
punitive damages stand.
In Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Company, Ltd., 701
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), for example, the Utah Supreme Court was
faced with a case involving fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit.
The allegations of the complaint were not refuted.

The Court

indicated:
Punitive damages, among other things, punish
conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless
indifference toward, and disregard of, the
rights of others.
Id. at page 1112.
Although the court refers to a "knowing or reckless indifference
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others" standard, it is
clear that the court was not adopting nor applying such a standard in that case.

The "intentional, willful and malicious"

allegations of plaintiff's complaint were unrefuted.

The fraud,

misrepresentation and deceit allegations were unchallenged.

The

court's comment indicate that a knowing and reckless indifference
may support a claim for punitive damages only in those cases
where the reckless indifference is supportive of a finding of
malice.
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In Von Hake v, Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), an
action was brought alleging fraud in the acquisition of the
Von Hake ranch.

Awards of $487,200.00 actual damages and

$500,000.00 punitive damages was affirmed.

In that case, the

jury was instructed that it could award punitive damages only
upon a finding that defendant's conduct was willful and malicious.

The jury apparently so found and the court affirmed the

finding.

However, the Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing the deci-

sion, again referred to the criteria spelled out in Behrens which
adopted the reasoning of Branch, which adopted the reasoning of
Terry.

Again, the court is recognizing a reckless and indif-

ferent standard only if such conduct is knowing and is supportive
of malice.
In Atkin, Wright and Miles v. The Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph, 20 Utah Advance Reports 20 (1985), the
Utah Supreme Court again had occasion to review the award of
punitive damages.

In reversing the trial court*s award of puni-

tive damages, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Before punitive damages may be awarded,
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is
willful and malicious, Lehi Furnisture
and Carpet Company v. Isom, Utah 657 P.2d
243, 312 (1982); First Security Bank of
Utah v. T.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653
P.2d 591, 598 (1982); Elkington v. Foust,
Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980); Kesler v.
Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (1975),
or that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference and disregard towards the
rights of others. Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., Utah 657 P.2d 267, 27778 (1982); Terry v. Zionfs Cooperative
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Merchantile Institution, Utah 605 P.2d
314, 327 (1979).
It is interesting to note that Terry was cited for support of a
"reckless indifference" standard, despite the fact that it was
expressly overturned in McFarland.

However, the court does not

say that punitive damages are allowed for reckless conduct alone.
Rather, the court states that punitive damages are allowed for
willful and malicious conduct, or conduct which manifests a
"knowing and reckless indifference towards the rights of others"
(i.e., state of mind as evidenced by the conduct).

Mere care-

less, negligent, or even reckless conduct, without evil motive or
design, or intentional or willful conduct as a minimum should not
support an award for punitive damages.
If plaintiff1s position were adopted by this court (i.e.
reckless or wanton activity is sufficient basis for an award of
punitive damages (Appellant's brief, p. 12), this would allow the
threat of punitive damages to be used as an in terrorem weapon in
every negligence case.

The distinctions between negligence,

carelessness, and recklessness are so fine that they are not subject to precise definition.

As defined in Black's Law

Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, citations omitted:
"Negligence" has been defined as:
The omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those ordinary
considerations which ordinarily regulate
human affairs would do, or the doing of
something which a reasonable and prudent
man would do.
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"Careless" has been defined as:
Synonymous with "negligent", the latter
being probably the better word in
pleadings. Adsence of ordinary or
proper care. Reckless. [Emphasis added.]
"Reckless" is defined as:
Not recking; careless, heedless, inattentive;
indifferent to consequences. According to
circumstances, it may mean desperately
heedless, wanton or willful, or it may
mean only careless, inattentive, or
negligent. [Emphasis added.]
Because the definitions of each of these terms overlap, it is
difficult to determine under what circumstances "recklessness"
would be the basis for punitive damages.

Plaintiff contends that

in any negligence case, reckless conduct may form a basis for an
award of punitive damages.

In any case of simple negligence, a

plaintiff therefore could attempt to obtain an award of punitive
damages by the semantical interplay of "careless or negligent"
conduct with "reckless" conduct.

The threat of an award of puni-

tive damages in simple negligence cases then becomes an in
terrorem weapon in every negligence case.

For these reasons it

is respectively submitted that the conduct which manifests "ill
will, malice, intent or other evil design" only should support a
claim for punitive damages. Mere reckless conduct, devoid of a
knowing, malicious, or intentional state of mind, would not form
the basis for such an award.

Applying this standard, the trial

court correctly granted a partial summary judgment eliminating
plaintiff's claims for punitive damages.
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POINT II,
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION CAN BE SUSTAINED
ON ADDITIONAL GROUNDS, i.e. THERE WAS NO
RECKLESS CONDUCT.
The trial court in its memorandum decision, striking
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, does not specifically
address the fact that there was no reckless conduct.

Such was

discussed in the record, however, and does support the trial
court's judgment.

Although appellants may not raise a contention

for the first time on appeal, the respondent may urge any point
reflected by the record in support of the trial court's judgment
during the appellate process.

Spencer v. Community Hospital of

Evanston, 87 II. Appeals 3rd 214, 408 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1980).
See also Fuller v. Favorite Theater Co., 119 Utah 570, 230 P.2d
335 (Utah 1951) (Ordinarily respondent may urge any matter
appearing in record in support of judgment appealed from); Adams
v. Liedholt, 38 Colo. App. 463, 536 P.2d 15, affirmed 579 P.2d
618 (1976).
It is clearly reflected in the record that the plaintiff, after completing its extensive discovery, had no evidence
whatsoever of any reckless conduct on the part of the defendant.
As stated earlier, plaintiff had no evidence that the defendant
had run a stop sign.

(See Facts Section.)

Although the evidence

produced during discovery and plaintiff's assertions during trial
are conflicting, plaintiff's own testimony states that she estimated the defendant's speed at the time of accident to be only 30
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mph.

(Partial transcript of trial proceeding, p. 117, lines

6-19.)
During a hearing for a motion to reconsider, the
following was clearly expressed:
The Court: What kind of evidence do you have
that intoxication had anything to do with
this accident?
Mr. Sullivan: Your Honor, she had just gotten
out of a wine and cheese party, literally.
She had just got into her car from a wine
and cheese party and was pulling out of a
little hotel place where they were having
the party when the accident occurred.
The Court:

So what?

Mr. Sullivan: Her intoxication level was
.10. She was convicted. We do not have
evidence as to this yet. There is reason
to believe she may have other drunk driving
situations in her past.
Mr. Williams: I'll object to that. There
is no evidence of that whatsoever.
The Court: Whether there is or whether
there is not, doesn't have anything to do
with this case. So you're saying she had
been to a wine and cheese party. She had
.10, and she got in an accident.
Mr. Sullivan:

That's right.

The Court: Anything else that indicates
that her conduct—was she traveling in
an extraordinary high rate of speed?
Did she collide with more than one car?
Was she weaving about the road? Was
there anything to indicate that she was
so intoxicated that we ought to be
offended by her conduct?
Mr. Sullivan: This intersection is sort
of a lfTlf intersection. There was no
reason—that is, she had better sight to
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her left than to her right. There is
no reason for her not to see the plaintiff
in this situation* There is no obstruction.
The Court: That is just simple negligence.
It happens all the time when people haven't
been drinking. That's the danger of this,
because someone may have had a drink.
Whether you believe in it or whether you
don't is not the issue. But the question
is, I can certainly see occasions where if
someone is so intoxicated; that assuming
your evaluation of the law is correct,
where someone is driving down State Street
at noon with a .3, and crashing into a
pedestrian, and traveling at a high rate
of speed, and weaving about, that's
something different than someone has
been to a wine and cheese party, and
failing to see what a lot of people fail
to see that haven't had a lot to drink.
That's the danger. Once you introduce
the question of the intoxication, you
open up a Pandora's box to all kinds of
abuses. [Emphasis added.]
(Partial transcript, p. 169-171)
Thus, it is clear that after extensive discovery, the
facts most favorable to the plaintiff are as follows:

(1) there

was an accident at the T-intersection in question; (2) defendant
failed to maintain a proper lookout and failed to yield the right
of way; (3) that at the time of the accident, the defendant had
just come from a wine and cheese party and had a blood alcohol
level of .10; and (4) defendant was traveling 30 mph at most.
There is no evidence that said blood alcohol level in any way
contributed to the accident.

Thus, it is clear that no

reasonable minds could differ on the issue that there was no
reckless conduct as a matter of law.
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Thus, even if this court

decides to extend the "reckless disregard" standard as justifying
punitive damages in all claims except false imprisonment, the
trial court's striking the punitive damages in this case was
still correct and should still be affirmed by this court,
POINT III,
AN ALLEGATION OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED IS
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.
The Supreme Court of Utah has not specifically addressed
the question of whether driving under the influence of intoxicants is sufficient to allow the jury to consider an award of
punitive damages. However, a review of the case law, supra,,
clearly suggests that to allow a jury to consider punitive
damages on the mere allegation of intoxication would go well
beyond the parameters established by the court.
Although some jurisdictions have allowed the jury to
consider punitive damages for an allegation of driving while
intoxicated, other courts have refused to go to that extreme and
have simply noted that the conduct of driving while intoxicated
does not amount to a malicious or willful act that has traditionally allowed punitive damages.

In Baber v, Dennis, 419

N.E.2d. 16 (Ohio Appeals 1979), the plaintiff alleged that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and intoxicated and
crashed her automobile in the rear end of the automobile driven
by plaintiff,

Defendent's intoxication was alleged to amount

to "willful, wanton, and recklessness conduct11, and plaintiff
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requested punitive damages.

The trial court allowed the issue of

punitive damages to go to the jury and plaintiff was awarded
$10,000.00 in punitive damages.

The appellate court therein

reversed the trial court and specifically held that evidence of
defendant's intoxication was insufficient to permit the issue
of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury.

The court

stated:
We conclude that the Supreme Court of Ohio
has not recognized or created a new
independent cause for wanton misconduct
where there has been a single, simple
violation of the motor vehicle laws and
that the extension of the right to
punitive damages in such a case is
unwarranted at this time regardless of
the nature of the unintentional legal
violation. Speed, for example, however
excessive, does not change the nature of
the cause of action; and the rule, to
this date, is the same even though a
condition of intoxication is present.
Id. at p. 20.
Fairly recently the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted this
same reasoning in the case of Detling v. Chockley, 436 N.E.2d.
208 (Ohio 1982).

In that case, plaintiff was a passenger on a

motorcycle that was struck by an automobile driven by defendant
and in plaintiff's complaint, she alleged that defendant, "was
operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and negligently and carelessly caused this collison."

During the

course of the litigation, plaintiff attempted to amend her cornpaint and allege punitive damages.

The trial court denied the

motion to amend on the basis that operating a vehicle under the
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influence of alcohol was not sufficient to permit the jury
consider punitive damages.

The court of appeals affirmed

judgment of the trial court on the issue of punitive damag
did the Supreme Court of Ohio*

The court stated:

An act of mere negligence does not, of
itself, demonstrate the degree of intention
and deliberation necessary to raise a
question of punitive damages, [Cites
omitted.]
"Something more than the
mere commission of a tort is always required
for punitive damages.
There must be
circumstances of aggravation or outrage,
such as spite or 'malice,1 or a fraudulent
or evil motive on the part of the defendant,
or such a conscious and deliberate disregard
of the interests of others that his conduct"""
may be called willful or wanton. Lack of
this element, there is general agreement
that mere negligence is not enough, even
though it is so extreme in degree as to be
characterized as 'gross1 . . . .
•

• *

Moreover, appellant's argument that evidence
of intoxication alone should raise such an
issue begs the threshhold question of
causation. Punitive damages may be imposed
only after establishing the defendant's
intoxication was the cause of the accident.
. . . "It would be possible for a drunken
driver to commit a negligent act in such as
manner as to not indicate intoxication.
For example, a drunken driver could be well
within the speed limit, drive a straight
line and have a rear-end collision with a
car stopped at an intersection. Rear-end
collisions are very common and are mostly
due to inattention, not intoxication. In
such an instance, it is extremely unlikely
one could get punitive damages and it is
arguable that one should not." [Emphasis
added.]
Id. at 211-212.
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The above holding in Detling v. Chockley, supra., was
later recognized by the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit in Moran v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d. 811
(6th Cir. 1982), and reaffirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Locofrance United States Corp. v. Interstate Distribution
Services, Inc., 451 N.E.2d. 1222 (Ohio 1983).
In Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d. (D.C. Cir. 1947), an
action was brought by plaintiff to recover punitive damages from
the defendant in an auto accident in which the defendant was
intoxicated.

The jury was instructed on punitive damages and a

verdict was awarded in favor of plaintiff.

The circuit court

reversed and, applying Maryland law, stated:
That the defendant had proved only
drunkenness which is neither malice, fraud,
or evil intent.
I_d. at 587.
Further, in Ruther v. Tyra, 247 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1952),
defendant was awarded punitive damages on his counterclaim
because of evidence of drinking on the part of plaintiff.

The

Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that it was error to instruct the
jury on punitive damages because there was no evidence of,
"oppression, fraud or malice", which by statute in the state of
Oklahoma justifies punitive damages.

The court stated:

To entitle the plaintiff to recover exemplary
damages in an action sounding in tort, the
proof must show some element of fraud, malice
or oppression. The act which constitutes the
cause of action must be actuated by, or
accompanied with, some evil intent, or must
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be the result of such gross negligence, such
disregard of another's rights, as is deemed
equivalent to such intent,
1^. at 968-969,
Finally, in Sears Roebuck and Co. v, Jones, 303 S.W.2d,
432 (Tex, 1957), the Texas court held that an unlawful act is not
of itself a ground for punitive damages and that an accident
involving two trucks where defendant was intoxicated did not support evidence that such driver acted wantonly or maliciously as
to justify the imposition of punitive damages,
POINT IV.
UTAH SOCIAL POLICY DOES NOT MANDATE THE
IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE.
Plaintiff asserts that compelling social policy mandates
support for the use of punitive damages in drunk driving cases
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8), and that the use of punitive damages
in such cases is consistent with legislative intent.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10). In the Appellant's Brief, the plaintiff states:
The Utah Legislature has expressed its strong
resolve to punish drunk drivers by passing
one of the strongest and most severe impaired
driving laws in the country. See §41-6-43,
et. seq. The new law provides mandatory jail
sentences for first-time offenders as well as
the mandatory suspension of a driver's license.
(Appellant's Brief p. 10)
In the case of Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.,
675 P.2d at 1186 (Utah 1983) and in Atkin, Wright, and Miles v.
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 20 Utah
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Advance Reports at 24 (1985), the Utah Supreme Court has clearly
stated:
Punitive damages "are not intended as
additional compensation to a plaintiff
[and] must, if awarded, serve a societal
interest of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is
not likely to be deterred by other means."
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.,
Utah 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (1983). Before
punitive damages may be awarded, the
plaintiff must prove conduct that is
willful and malicious [cites omitted],
or that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference or disregard toward the
rights of others. [Emphasis added].
20 Utah Advance Reports at 24.
It is clear that Utah law does not provide for punitive
damages unless there is "outrageous and malicious conduct" which
is "not likely to be deterred by other means."

As pointed out by

the plaintiff, the Utah legislature has expressed "one of the
strongest and most severe impaired driving laws in the country."
Thus, by plaintiff1s own admission, it is clear that the award of
punitive damages in civil cases involving a defendant who has
driven under the influence of intoxicants is clearly
inappropriate since such conduct is "likely to be deterred by
other means."

Certainly the strongest and most severe impaired

driving law is likely to deter conduct.

In this regard, the Utah

legislature has clearly established where the punishment and
deterence is to take place and that is in the criminal law and
not the civil law.
In the case of Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.,
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supra., so heavily relied upon by the plaintiff, the court
clearly stated the purpose of punitive damages:
Since punitive damages are not intended as
additional compensation to the plaintiff,
they must, if awarded, serve a societal
interest of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is not
likely to be deterred by other means.
Id. at p. 1186.
The Utah Supreme Court could not be more clear that
punitive damages are not intended as compensation to the plaintiff but are to serve the interests of society.

The plaintiff

should not be allowed to line her pockets with money taken from
the defendant in the interest of society, and where such award is
in addition to the

compensatory damages she recovers for the

violation to her rights protected by the civil law.

As stated in

the Appellant's Brief, the defendant was convicted for driving
under the influence.

(Appellate1s Brief, p. 2). Defendant's

driver's license was suspended for a year and defendant was
required to pay a fine.

Such suspension and fine was the

punishment and deterrence judged to be appropriate by the court
in the criminal trial and also by the state legislature.
Plaintiff now seeks to appropriate to herself society's due after
society has already extracted from the defendant what the court
and legislature has deemed appropriate punishment and deterence.
Clearly this has never been the intent of Utah law.
In the case of Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d. 188 (Ind.
App. 1978), an action was brought to recover for injuries
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sustained in an automobile collision.

The trial court rendered

summary judgment for the defendant on the claim of punitive
damages and plaintiffs appealed.

The court of appeals held

that where defendant had been convicted and sentenced for the
offense of reckless driving in connection with the accident,
plaintiffs were barred from recovering punitive damages.
It should be noted that under the facts of our present
case, defendant was not charged nor convicted with reckless
driving, a specific intent crime.

Rather, defendant in our case

was only charged with the violation of an absolute liability
crime, namely operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol blood
level in excess of .08. Such statute, as pointed out by
plaintiff, is one of the most stringent in the country.

Clearly

the facts presented in the instant case make a stronger argument
for the denial of punitive damages than the facts in Glissman.
In Glissman, punitive damages were denied in light of a conviction for a specific intent crime which would be more analogous to
the civil malice in fact standard.

Under the facts of the

present case, however, defendant was convicted of an absolute
liability crime which specifically carries a standard of simple
negligence.

(Utah Code Annotated Sec. 41-6-44 (3)(b)).

If the

imposition of punitive damages was prohibited under the facts of
Glissman, clearly the court under the facts present in the
instant case should deny punitive damages.
In Glissman, the court stated:
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At the outset it must be recalled that a
civil litigant has no absolute right to
secure punitive, or exemplary damages,
[Cites omitted]. They are awarded in
furtherance of public policy to promote
the public safety and punish and deter
certain wrongdoers. [Cites omitted].
Considering this basis for punitive damages,
the court in Taber v. Hutson, (1954), 5 Ind.
322, 325, reversed an award in a civil action
for assault and battery, stating:
Where the defendant is sued for the
commission of a tort, such as slander,
an offense not the subject of
criminal punishment, the rule that
gives damages fto punish the offender,1
may, with some degree of propriety,
be applied, because it is the only
mode in which, by public example,
the various rights in community to
personal security and private property
can, under the sanction of law, be
protected from injury and outrage.
In such a case, there is wisdom in
permitting a jury to 'blend together
the interest of society and of the
aggrieved individual.f
But there is a class of offenses,
the commission of which, in addition
to the civil remedy allowed the
injured party, subjects the offender
to a state prosecution. To this
class, the case under consideration
belongs; and if the principle of
the instruction be correct, Taber
may be twice punished for the same
assault and battery. This would
not accord with the spirit of our
institutions. The Constitution
declares, that 'no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense;1 and though that provision
may not relate to the remedies
secured by civil proceedings, still
it serves to illustrate a fundamental
principle inculcated by every wellregulated system of government, viz.,
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that each violation of the law should
be certainly followed by one appropriate
punishment and no more.
The state has undertaken to vindicate
her own wrongs; and can there be any
valid reason why such vindication
should be the result of a suit in
favor of the private individual?
It matters little to the offender
what be the form in which he pays
the penalty, so that he pays but once;
but the rules of pleading and evidence
to not permit a judgment like the
present to be set up as a bar to a
state prosecution. Hence, the
defendant still remains liable to
be tried and convicted for a public
offense. Though liable to be
punished, a civil proceeding may not,
it is true, be instituted against
him; but that contingency does not
affect the principle involved,
because the penalty which he has
incurred belongs to the state, and
her failure to sue for it would
furnish no reason for its recovery
in this action.
Id. at p. 1190.
POINT V.
THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A CIVIL
SUIT WHERE A CRIMINAL PENALTY HAS ALREADY BEEN
ASSESSED AGAINST THE SAME DEFENDANT FOR THE
SAME CONDUCT VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah
states:

" . . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy

for the same offense."

[Emphasis added.]

The Utah Supreme Court

has clearly stated that the purpose of punitive damages is to
punish and deter.

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675

P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.,
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Ltd, , 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and Atkin, Wright and Miles v.
The Mountain States and Telegraph Co,, 20 Utah Advance Reports 20
(1985).

As stated earlier, the defendant has already been

punished for the act of driving under the influence of intoxicants on August 21, 1981, at the intersection of 5065 W. North
Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah.

For this identical conduct,

plaintiff now seeks to penalize the defendant again by the
imposition of punitive damages. Thus if plaintiff's argument
prevails, defendant will be punished twice for the same
wrong.

Although some other jurisdictions allow imposition of

punitive damages in a civil action even though the same wrongful
conduct of the defendant may subject him to criminal punishment,
most of those jurisdictions have either failed to address the
double jeopardy argument or, if they have done so, have merely
relied on "the great weight of authority11 to support their
rulings following other cases.

See Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal.

532, 18 P. 668 (1888); Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 118 P.2d 729
(1941); Rosnak v. Leathers, 277 Ore. 207, 560 P.2d 275 (1977).
If the imposition of punitive damages, after the imposition of a
criminal fine and other criminal penalties, does not violate
double jeopardy, it would be for one of two reasons:

(1) that

double jeopardy is confined to criminal prosecutions, or (2) that
criminal penalties are for the wrong done to society whereas
punitive damages are for the wrong done to the individual.
In regard to this first argument, the Utah Constitution

-33-

clearly states:
The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; . . . , nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Sec. 12.
It is clear that the Utah Constitution makes no distinction with
regard to double jeopardy between civil and criminal cases.
Although the first portion of Sec. 12 of Article 1 deals with
criminal prosecutions, and indeed the first half of the last sentence of said section starts out "the accused," the last phrase
clearly extends the prohibition against double jeopardy to "any
person."
The second argument against the application of double
jeopardy protection to cases such as this has already been
discussed.

The Utah Supreme Court has made clear as recently as

Atkins decided October 22, 1985, that punitive damages are for
the interest of society to punish and deter.

In this regard,

conpensatory damages are imposed for the wrong done to the
plaintiff.

Punitive damages are not intended as additional

compensation to the plaintiff.
5 P.

In Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541,

119, 120 (1884), the court stated:
When the convention framed and when the
people adopted the constitution, both
understood the purpose of this clause to
be the prevention of double prosecutions
for the same offense. Yet, under the rule
allowing exemplary damages, not only may
two prosecutions, but also two punishments
be had. What difference does it make to
the accused so far as this question is
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concerned that one prosecution takes the
form of a civil action in which he is
called defendant? He is practically
harrassed with two prosecutions and
subjected to two convictions; while no
hypothesis, however ingenious, can
cloud in his mind the palpable fact that
for the same act he suffers two punishments?
Id. at p. 120.
Punitive damages being for the purpose of punishment and
deterence are clearly penal in character.

Imposition of punitive

damages subsequent to the imposition of criminal penalties is
clearly in violation of the letter and spirit of the Utah
Constitution.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING
AGGRAVATION OF INJURY WAS CLEARLY CORRECT,
ADEQUATE AND IN NO WAY PREJUDICIAL.
Plaintiff was not prevented from having her theory of
the case presented to the jury.

The substance of plaintiff's

proposed instruction No. 11 and the instruction given by the trial
court are virtually identical.

Plaintiff's proposed instruction

No. 11 reads:
Plaintiff, Royce Biswell, may not recover
damages for any pre-existing condition or
disability she may have had which did not
result from any fault of the defendant, but
that she is entitled to recover damages for
any injury she suffered, including any
aggravation or lighting up of such a preexisting condition or disability, which
was proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
The instruction actually given by the trial court reads:
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You are instructed that the damages that may
be assessed in this case should not be
reduced simply because the plaintiff may
suffer from a pre-existing or abnormal
condition. If you find that the plaintiff
suffers from an abnormal or pre-existing
condition which has not been proximately
caused by the accident, even though it may
invite your sympathy, you may not assess
any damage against the defendant for that
condition. However, if the accident has
been a proximate cause of aggravating such
pre-existing or abnormal condition, that
should be considered by you in determining
general damages.
The operative language of the two instructions is the
same.

Plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 11 states that the

plaintiff may not recover for any pre-existing condition or
disability not the result of defendant's fault but that plaintiff
may recover for aggravation or lighting up of such a pre-existing
condition or disability.

The instruction actually given by the

trial court states that the jury may not award plaintiff damages
for any pre-existing condition not caused by the defendant but
that plaintiff may recover for any aggravation of such preexisting condition caused by the defendant.
In fact, the instruction actually given is more
favorable to the plaintiff than the instruction the plaintiff
requested.

Unlike plaintiff's requested instruction, the

instruction actually given states that plaintiff's damages may
not be reduced because the plaintiff may suffer from a preexisting condition.
instruction.

This is omitted in plaintiff's proposed

Furthermore, plaintiff s proposed instruction "did
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not give the jury the slightest inkling that it could award
plaintiff damages for her entire disability if it found that the
accident flit up1 or 'activated1 the pre-existing condition."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 29). The plaintiff's jury instruction
simply does not refer in any way to any distinction between
asymptomatic and symptomatic pre-existing conditions.
Plaintiff cites Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d. 364, 412
P.2d 451 (Utah 1966), as authority that a defendant is liable for
all suffering in an asymptomatic pre-existing condition rather
than being liable only for the aggravated pain caused by the
accident.

It should be pointed out, however, that no such

conclusion of law was made by court in that case.

In fact, it

was plaintiff's counsel and not the court in Brunson that
inferred an asymptomatic pre-existing condition but even plaintiff's counsel in Brunson made no claim that the defendant should
be liable for all pain and suffering undimished by the additional
cause of the pre-existing arthritis.
In rejecting plaintiff's appeal and affirming the trial
court's instructions, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The instructions should be read in their
entire context and given meaning in
accordance with the ordinary and usual
import of the language as it would be
understood by lay jurors, rather than by
resorting to undue niceties of meaning
or technical distinctions in terms. More
important than that, they should be looked
at from the viewpoint of the jury in
application to the facts as shown by the
evidence.
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Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d at 452-453.

That plaintiff's pro-

posed instruction No. 11 adds nothing to the court's instruction
No. 17 is so clear that reasonable minds could not reach any
other result.
Plaintiff's basic reasoning misses the entire point
which he is trying to make:

If a plaintiff suffers no pain

before an accident, then the pain experienced after the accident
which is a result of defendant's conduct is recoverable. If,
however, a plaintiff experienced pain before an accident, then
only the additional pain caused by the actions of the defendant
are recoverable.

In either case, defendant is only liable for

the amount of pain caused by her actions, thus it is completely
irrelevant whether or not there was pain before the accident.
It is clear from Utah case law that the trial court's
instruction regarding aggravation was a correct statement of Utah
law.

If it was different in any way from the instruction

requested by the plaintiff, it was more favorable than that
requested by the plaintiff and therefore in no way prejudicial.
CONCLUSIONS
The imposition of punitive damages in this case should
not be allowed without evidence of actual malice, ill will or
evil motive.

For this reason, the trial court properly struck

plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.
Even if the court decides a "reckless indifference"
standard is applicable to this case, the facts of this case
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clearly indicate that there was no reckless conduct. Therefore,
the claim for punitive damages were properly struck.
Driving while intoxicated, in and of itself, is clearly
insufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.

Even if

the court decides that a "reckless indifference11 standard should
be applied, there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate
intoxication contributed to the cause of this accident.

This is

a case of simple negligence and as such punitive damages are
inapplicable even if the defendant was driving while intoxicated.
Under the rule clearly stated in Behrens, that punitive
damages should not be awarded unless conduct is not likely to be
deterred by other means, an award of punitive damages in this
case would clearly be inappropriate in light of the severe
impaired driving laws in the State of Utah.
The purpose of criminal penalties in regard to drunk
driving are to deter and to punish.
of punitive damages.

These are the same purposes

Since the defendant was already subject to

criminal penalties, she should not be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense since such would be a violation of Article
1, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
Finally, the trial court's jury instruction regarding
aggravation of plaintiff1s injuries was clearly a correct statement of Utah law and in no way prejudicial to the defendant.
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For the above stated reasons, it is clear that the trial
court's judgments in this case should be affirmed in every
respect.
Dated this

(i

~

day of December, 1985.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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